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Pension Reform in Hungary  Hungary's pension reform
package  has been largely
successful,  significantly
A Preliminary Assessment  reducing  imbalances  in the
pay-as-you-go  system  and the
Roberto  Rocha  implicit pension debt while
Dimitri  Vittas  introducing a mandatory,
funded, privately  managed
pillar that seems  to be
operating fairly well despite
initial problerns in the
payment and registration
systems  and some regulatory
weaknesses.  Current
shortcomings can be
corrected by restoring the
original 8 percent
contribution rate to the
second  pillar and
strengthening the regulatory
and supervisory  framework.
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Summary findings
Hungary is entering the fourth year of a multi-pillar  for young workers, and most young workers effectively
pension reform that has proved popular among workers  opted for the new system. But the new system was
despite initially lukewarm support from the government  probably oversold as well, making older workers-who
that succeeded the reforming government, and despite  would be better off staying in the reformed PAYG
the poor initial performance of capital markets because  system-switch,  too.
of Russia's crisis in 1998. Roughly half the labor force  The government has so far decided not to increase the
joined the new system voluntarily. Most who switched  contribution  to the second pillar from 6 to 8 percent, as
were younger than 40.  originally planned, so efficiency gains in labor and capital
Many people switched to the system because it offered  markets may also be smaller than expected.
more risk diversification. The pay-as-you-go (PAYG)  Addressing projected deficits in the PAYG system may
system, which had been severely damaged by repeated  require further  adjustments, such as delaying the
manipulation of its parameters, clearly offered a low  retirement age and shifting to indexed prices, reducing
return  on contributions. The new system is still  net benefits to future generations. Reform has sharply
predominantly  PAYG.  The first pillar accounts for more  reduced the severe initial bias against future generations
than two-thirds of the total contribution,  but the new  but hasn't eliminated it altogether.
second pillar offers the chance of higher average returns  The voluntary switching strategy achieves the same
on contributions.  outcome as a forced switch based on an arbitrary cutoff
Most workers probably intuited the risk and returns  age, while preventing legal problems and contributing to
inherent in a pure PAYG  system and mixed system,  reduction of the implicit pension debt. But it leaves a few
including the capital market risk in the second pillar and  individuals worse off than if they'd chosen their best
the political risk in the PAYG  pillar. The new system  option-a  problem a well-designed public information
offers better prospects of long-run risk-adjusted returns  campaign can reduce.
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In the summer of 1997, the Hungarian Parliament  passed a proposal for a systemic reform to
the pension system, involving substantive changes to the existing public pay-as-you-go (PAYG)
system and the introduction  of a new pension system.  The new system comprises a smaller public
PAYG system (the first pillar), and a new, funded and privately-managed  system (the second pillar).
A voluntary, funded and privately-managed  pillar (the third pillar) already existed before the reform
and continues  to operate and grow.
The new pension system started operating  in January 1998, and became mandatory for all new
workers entering the labor force after July of that year. Workers  with accrued rights in the old PAYG
pension system could choose  to stay in the reformed  PAYG system  or switch to the new multi-pillar
system. At the end of September 1999 (the deadline  for switching  to the new system), more than two
million workers accounting for half of the labor force had decided to switch to the new pension
system.  Although some workers are expected to switch back to the reformed PAYG system until
December 2002 (the extended deadline for switching back to the PAYG), the  large number of
switchers reveals the popularity of the reform among workers, particularly of workers under 40,
which account for more than 80 percent of the total number of switchers.
The Hungarian pension reform was the first systemic pension reform implemented in Central
and Eastern Europe. Since then, a number  of other countries have also implemented or are about to
implement  this type of reform, including  Poland, Croatia, Latvia,  Macedonia,  and Kazakhstan. Multi-
pillar systems are under preparation  or consideration  in several other countries of the region as well.
The  fact that  Hungary pioneered this  type  of  reform in  the  region,  and  that  three  years of
implementation  have passed, raises a natural interest in the Hungarian reform experience, and in the
lessons that may be identified  for other  countries.
The interest in the Hungarian reform experience  may be enhanced by the fact that the center-
right Government  that succeeded  the reformist center-left  Government  in mid-  1998-after  six months
of reform implementation-demonstrated just a lukewarm  support for the reform. The lack of initial
support was revealed in numerous official statements, claiming that the reform had not been well
prepared and that  it had  an adverse impact on  the public finances.  One clear evidence of the
lukewarm support was the new Government's decision to maintain the contribution to the second
pillar at 6 percent, instead of increasing it gradually  to 8 percent, as originally planned and prescribed
in the legislation. This measure may have important  implications  for some particular cohorts and for
market participants,  and raises a number of issues which are relevant for other reforming countries.
IThis paper reviews  the main components  and objectives of the  Hungarian pension  reform, and
makes  a preliminary  assessment  of the first  years of  its implementation.  The paper  is structured  as
follows.  The second section  provides  some background material,  examining  briefly the performance
of  the  pension  system  before  the  reform,  and  showing  long-run  projections  of  the  system  in  the
absence of reform.  The third  section describes  the  overall reform  package,  examines the  switching
results,  and provides  a number of long-run  actuarial  simulations  of the new multi-pillar  system.  The
fourth  section  examines  the  structure  and  performance  of  the  private  pillars  in the  early  stages  of
implementation.  Finally,  the fifth  section provides  some  conclusions  and  identifies  possible  lessons
for other countries.
2.  The Situation  of the Pension  System  Before  the Reform 2
The Performance  of the System in  the Post- War Period
The Hungarian  PAYG  system matured rapidly  in the post-war  period, as reflected  in the rapid
increase  in the system  dependency ratio  (the ratio  of pensioners to workers),  and the  increase  in the
average  replacement  ratio (the ratio  of the average  pension to the  average  net wage).  As shown  in
Figure  1, the  system  dependency  ratio  surpassed the  old  age dependency  ratio  already  in the  mid-
1  970s, due primarily  to the low retirement  age of women, who comprised  an increasing proportion  of
the pensioner  population,  and whose life expectancy  at retirement  rose from 20 to 33 years  in the  last
decades.
The average  replacement  ratio  also  increased  steadily  in the  post-war  period  (Figure  2), as  a
result  not only of longer  average contribution  periods, but also  of more  generous  benefits and  more
permissive  eligibility  rules.  The increase  in the  number  of  pensioners  and  in the  average  benefit
levels  led to a steady increase in pension expenditures-from  less than  5 percent of GDP in 1970s to
more than  10 percent  of GDP in 1990, requiring increasing contribution rates to balance the system.
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2By the early 1990s, total contribution  rates to the PAYG amounted to around 34.5 percent of gross
wages, including  30.5 percent for old age and survivors  and around 4 percent for underage disability
pensions.
The Hungarian PAYG scheme arrived in the 1990s with difficulties to balance expenditures
and revenues, despite charging one of the highest contribution  rates in the world (Tables I  and 2)3
During the 1990s the PAYG system was subject to further pressures,  caused by a significant loss of
revenues and a sharp increase  in the system  dependency  ratio. As shown in Tables 1 and 2, the loss of
revenues amounted to almost 3 percent of GDP before the reform, due primarily to an erosion of the
tax base (the covered wage bill).  Such base erosion was due not only to problems of ceilings and
exemptions, but also to increasing evasion of the heavy payroll tax.  The increase in the system
dependency  ratio amounted to 66 percent during  the 1990s,  most of which occurring in the first half
of the decade (Figure 1).  This dramatic increase in the dependency  ratio was due to a reduction in
labor force  participation, increases in  unemployment, and  the  maintenance of  generous early
retirement  and disability schemes  as a buffer against unemployment.
The sharp increase in the number of pensioners implied strong pressures on expenditures  and,
combined with the revenue loss, would have resulted in very large PAYG deficits, in the absence of
other correcting measures.  The main  correction that  took place involved the  manipulation of
indexation parameters in the benefit formula, and which resulted in a significant drop of the average
replacement ratio.  A sharp real wage compression  that took place in the mid-1990s (around 15
percent in 1995 and 1996)  also contributed  to the decline in real pensions, given the wage indexation
of pensions. The final result of these measures  was a drop in pension expenditures relative to GDP,
and only modest PAYG deficits in  the early and mid-1990s!4
Although  these corrections  prevented  the emergence  of large deficits in the PAYG system, they
were perceived as arbitrary and unfair, diminishing  the credibility of the PAYG in the eyes of the
population. Furthermore,  the scope for additional  ad hoc corrections  narrowed severely, making the
system even more vulnerable to the demographic shocks projected for.the  215'  century.  As the
consequences of a  "do  nothing" scenario were more widely understood, it became increasingly
apparent that that the public pension system  needed more fundamental  reform. Before examining the
long-run projections  of the system, it must be noted that the PAYG deficits have increased  somewhat
after 1997 (the year when the reform was passed), but these deficits raise less concem, because they
2 This section draws on Palacios  and Rocha (1998).
3The  PAYG is defined so as to include contribution  revenues, the pension expenditures  of the Pension Insurance  Fund, and
the underage disability pensions of the Health Insurance Fund.  It is arbitrarily assumed that the underage disability
expenditures  are covered by an equivalent  amount of revenues.
3are partly  due to the  creation  of a second pillar, and because the  actuarial  imbalances  of the  system
were  already being addressed by the reform.
Table  1: Revenues, Expenditures  and Balance of the PAYG, 1991-99  (in % of GDP)
1991  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Contribution  Revenues  11.0  8.9  8.4  8.3  8.2  7.8
Pension Fund  7.5  7.1  7.0  7.0  6.8
Health Fund (disability)  1.2  1.1  1.1  1.0  1.0
Pension Expenditures  10.5  9.1  8.5  8.3  8.7  8.8
Old age  6.8  6.3  6.2  6.4  6.4
Survivor  1.1  1.0  1.0  1.1  1.1
Disability  1.2  1.1  1.1  1.2  1.3
PAYG Balance  0.5  -0.2  -0.1  0.0  -0.5  -1.0
Revenue  loss to second pillar  0.3  0.6
Pure PAYG Balance  0.5  -0.2  -0.1  0.0  -0.2  -0.4
Table  2: Base of Payroll Tax (% of GDP) and Contribution Rates (%),  1991-98
1991  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Covered  Wage Bill/GDP  30.9  23.6  22.2  22.4  22.1  22.3
Total Contribution  Rate  34.5  34.5  34.5  34.0  34.0  33.0
Pension Fund  30.5  30.5  30.5  30.0  31.0  30.0
Health  Fund (notional)  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  3.0  3.0
The  Future of the PA  YG System in the Absence  of Reform
Along with the  rest of Europe, Hungary will experience  rapid population  aging  in the next few
decades,  a development  that will submit  the pension  system to great pressures.  The impact  of these
adverse  demographic  trends  in the  absence of reforms  was assessed  through  the  use of  an actuarial
model  developed  during the  reform. 5 The base year  used for the actuarial  projections  is 1997-the
year preceding  the implementation  of the reform. The main economic  and demographic  assumptions
used in the actuarial  projections  are shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Main Economic  and Demographic  Assumptions for Pension Simulations,  1997-2070
1998  1999  2000-2030  2000-2070
Economic Assumptions
Real GDP Growth  5.0  4.1  3.0  2.7
Real Wage Growth  3.5  3.5  3.0  3.0
Inflation Rate  14.3  10.0  3.4  3.0
Unemployment  Rate  9.0  8.0  7.0  7.0
Demographic  Assumptions
Population Growth  -0.3  -0.3  -0.2  -0.3
Employment  Growth  1.4  1.1  0.0  -0.3
Life Expectancy (Men)  65.1  65.0  71.8  76.4
Life Expectancy  (women)  74.6  74.8  79.3  84.5
Note:  Actual  figures  for 1998  and 1999.  GDP  growth  is  derived  from  wage  growth.  The  labor  share  is  assumed  to remain
constant.  Life  expectancy  is  years  at birth,  based  on  current  mortality.
4Palacios  and Rocha  (1998)  provide  a more  detailed  analysis  of the performance  of pension  revenues  and expenditures
during  the 1990s.
The  actuarial  model  was  developed  by  Patrick  Wiese.
4The economic  assumptions  include  a decline  in inflation  rates to Western  European  levels,  a
constant  labor share  in GDP,  and a moderate  decline in the unemployment  rate.  The demographic
assumptions  are  the  same  as  the  baseline  scenario  developed  by  Hablicsek  (1995),  and  imply  a
declining  population  and  a  significant  increase  in  the  old  age  dependency  ratio.  The  system
dependency  ratio  also  increases  as a  result,  although  this  increase  is somewhat  moderated  by  the
assumption  that labor force participation rates converge gradually to the  levels prevailing  in Western
Europe.  This implies  a moderate  increase in labor force participation  rates  from the  current  levels,
especially  for women.6
Under  these  demographic  and  economic  assumptions,  and  in  the  absence  of  reforms,  the
Hungarian  PAYG  system would  generate growing  deficits, as shown in Figure 3.  The deficits would
grow to around 2 percent  of GDP at the end of the first decade of the century,  and would converge to
around 6.5 percent  of GDP in 2070, the end of the projection period.  The result  is essentially  due to
the assumption  of a declining  rate of inflation and to adverse demographic  trends.  The decline in the
rate  of inflation  implies  increasing  real average pensions and  replacement  ratios,  because of the  full
backward  wage indexation  rule (prevailing before the reforms), and also because of smaller  inflation-
related  losses  in  entry  level  pensions  (the  former  benefit  formula  contained  several  indexation
parameters  that made entry level pensions very sensitive to inflation).
Whereas  the decline  in inflation  is the major  cause  of the early  deficits,  demographic  factors
dominate the results  after the first decade.  The projected  fluctuations  in the deficit closely mirror the
old age and system dependency  ratios, as shown in Figure 4.  Both ratios  increase between  1995 and
2017,  followed  by  a  ten  year  period  of  stability,  followed  by  another  increase.  The  old  age
dependency  ratio  nearly  doubles  to 65 percent  at the  end of the projection  period,  while  the system
lgume  3:  Balmans  of he  ic  Pension  Sdeme inthe  I  Figure 4: Old Age and System Dependency
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6 Labor  force participation  for women in their  30s and 40s are assumed to  increase from  around 70 percent  to around  75-83
percent.  This assumption  was adopted  because  labor force participation  rates declined  significantly  during the early stages of
the transition  in the 1990s, from Hungary's  historical  levels and from the levels prevailing  in most European  countries.
5dependency  ratio grows to 120  percent.
In the absence of reforms, balancing the pension system in 2070 would require increasing the
contribution  rate to more than 55 percent,  or reducing  the replacement  ratio from around 60 percent to
less than 3  5 percent. This would either cause even greater distortions  in the labor market and/or great
dissatisfaction  and unrest among future pensioners. It is also clear that the absence of reforms would
imply a massive burden on future generations, irrespective  of whether the future imbalances were
financed by higher contributions, lower replacement  ratios, or general taxes.  Recent calculations of
generational accounts confirm that workers under 38 years of age would be net contributors to the
system, and that the net tax burden  on future generations  would  be particularly  heavy. 7
3.  The Hungarian  Pension Reform
General Description  of the Original Reform Package
The reform package  gave workers  the choice  to stay in a reformed  PAYG or to switch to a new,
mixed  pension system  until end-August  1999. Workers  who initially opted for the new system will be
able to  return to  the reformed PAYG until December 2002.  After that date, workers will  be
permanently affiliated either with the reformed PAYG or with the new system.  New entrants  in the
labor  force after  July 1998  have  been  automatically  enrolled  in  the new mixed  system.
The reforms  to the PAYG included  the following  main components:  (i) a higher  normal retirement
age of 62 for both  men and women  (from 60 and 55, respectively);  (ii) an increase  in the number  of years
of service  to be eligible for early retirement  without  penalties  to 40 years; (iii) increases  in the penalties
.for early retirement  and in the rewards  for late  retirement;  (iv) changes in the benefit  formula  designed  to
eliminate its explicit redistributive  elements (i.e. a  correction factor that penalized higher income
workers); (v) a new tax regime; and (vi) a shift from backward  net wage indexation to a "Swiss"
indexation formula consisting of a combination  of contemporaneous  price and wage indexation (50
percent net wages,  50 percent consumer  prices).
The new legislation included detailed transition tables for the retirement age increase, the
corresponding  early retirement  penalties,  the minimum  years of service  for early retirement without  and
with penalties,  and a new set of accrual rates which apply to gross rather than net wage history. The
retirement  age and the minimum  years of service  for early retirement  started  rising immediately  but only
reach their final state in the year 2009. The new legislation  also included  a transition  period  for the new
6indexation  formula, specifying  the maintenance  of full backward  wage indexation  for 1998 and 1999,
followed by a mixed 70-30 percent (wage-prices)  contemporaneous  indexation  formula for 2000, and
finally a contemporaneous  Swiss  formula  for 2001 and subsequent  years. The new benefit  formula and
tax regime  will become  effective  by 2013.
Many of the changes reflected  the Government's  position  that redistribution  should be removed
from the pension scheme.  This was based on the Government's desire to tighten the link between
contributions  and benefits  in order  to improve  compliance  and the insurance  characteristics  in the system.
An element of intra-generational  redistribution  was maintained,  but in the form of a minimum  top-up,
means-tested  pension  benefit  financed  outside  the pension  system.
As summarized  in Table  4, workers  deciding  to stay in tlr reformed  PAYG  will pay a contribution
rate of 30 percent of their gross wages, and will earn an accrual rate of 1.65 percent for each year of
service.8 Workers  who switch to the new system  will have 22 percent of their gross wages channeled
to the first (PAYG) pillar, earning  an annual accrual  rate of 1.22 percent for each year of service. The
switching  workers would earn the same 1.22 percent accrual  rate for every year of service before the
switching date.  The switching workers would also contribute 8 percent of their gross wages to their
second pillar accounts. This contribution  rate structure  would follow a two year transitional  period-
the contribution  to the second  pillar would be 6 percent in 1998,  7 percent in 1999 and 8 percent from
2000 onward.  The overall contribution  rate would remain at 30 percent and the contribution to the
first pillar would  be reduced  accordingly.
The first pillar of the new multipillar  system applies the same rules as the reformed PAYG,
including  higher  retirement  age, minimum  years of service,  and indexation  arrangements. However,  the
benefit formula  was scaled down in proportion  with the size of the contribution  rates.  Therefore,  the
annual accrual  rate in the new first pillar was reduced  to 1.22 percent,  or roughly 74 percent of the 1.65
accrual rate which applies for those workers who remain in the reformed PAYG scheme.  This
corresponds  to the ratio of the contribution  rate to the PAYG paid by workers who switch to  the
multipillar  scheme  to the contribution  rate paid  by workers  who do not switch,  namely 22/30. For those
who switch  to the new scheme,  the 1.22  accrual  rate applies  for both  past and future  years of participation
in the system, implying  that anyone  who switches  is voluntarily  forfeiting  approximately  one quarter  of
their acquired  rights in the process.
Auerbach, Kotlikoff,  and Leibfriz (1999)  provide a general methodology  of generational  accounts and empirical  results for
several countries. Gal, Simonovits,  and Tarcali (2000)  construct  generational  accounts for Hungary.
8 Workers  staying  in the reformed  PAYG can also obtain  additional  coverage  from the voluntary,  third pillar,  which has been in
existence  since 1994. Vittas (1996)  provides  an early  analysis  of the Hungarian  third  pillar.
7Table 4:  Main Elements of the Reform Package
"Old" PAYG  "Reformed"  PAYG  New System
First  Pillar  Second  Pillar
Contribution  rate  30%  30%o  24-23-22%  6-7-8%
Annual accrual  rates  Non-linear,  equivalent  Linear,  1.65%  of  Linear,  1.22%  of  n.a..
to 2% of net wage  gross  wage  gross  wage
Pension  Base  Gradual  increase  to  Gradual  increase  to  Gradual  increase  to
lifetime  earnings  lifetime  earnings  lifetime  earnings
Redistribution  factor  Yes  No  No
Normal  retirement  age  60 (men);  55 (women)  62 (both)  62 (both)  62 (both)
Early  retirement  rules  Low penalty  rates  and  Higher  penalty  rates  Higher  penalty  rates
minimum  service  and minimum  service  and minimum  service
years for  early  years for  early  years  for early
retirement  retirement  retirement
Indexation  of pensions  Backward  net wage  Contemporaneous  Contemporaneous
indexation  Swiss  Swiss
As discussed in greater detail in section 4,  workers who switch to the new system and contribute
for at least 15 years to the new second pillar are guaranteed a minimum  second pillar benefit equal to 25
percent  of  the  first pillar  pension.  The guarantee is modest for new workers,  being  equivalent to  a
minimum lifetime real return of only 0 percent p.a..  However, the guarantee is equivalent to a minimum
lifetime  real  return  of  more  than  4  percent  p.a. for  workers  in their  mid-forties,  due  to  the  shorter
accumulation period.  Therefore, the guarantee could be triggered for workers in their  mid-forties who
switch to the new scheme, although the amount required to meet this guarantee should not be significant.
Changes in the Reform  by the New Government
The elections  of May  1998 resulted in the  departure  of the  Government  which  designed  and
implemented  the pension reform, and which consisted of a coalition of the socialist party (a center-left
party)  and the party of free democrats  (a center-right  party).  Another  coalition  Government  formed
by the  party  of young  democrats  (a center-right  party) and  the  party of  small  shareholders  (a right
party) won the elections by a narrow margin.  The new Government  did not give  emphasis to pension
reform  in its  pre-election  program,  nor  did it  mention  its  intention  to modify  the  ongoing  reform
during the campaign period, but has expressed less than full support to the reform  during its tenure.
One of the first measures  announced by the new Government  was the decision  to maintain  the
contribution  rate to the  second pillar  at 6 percent in 1999, instead of increasing  it to 7 and  8 percent,
as originally  planned.  Another important measure  involved changes  in the transition  indexation  rules
negotiated  during  the  reform  preparation.  More  specifically,  instead  of  maintaining  the  backward
wage  indexation  in 1999 (which would have resulted in nominal pension  increases of  18 percent),  the
Government  announced  an  ad  hoc  increase  of  14 percent.  The  announcement  of  these  changes
created uncertainty  among  workers and market participants,  especially  as they were  not accompanied
8by an announcement of the policies that would be followed in 2000 and in future years.  Some
politicians in the new coalition  raised the level of uncertainty  further,  by announcing  their intention  to
introduce  more fundamental  changes and even to roll back the reform entirely.
Political factors may have motivated  these initial sharp attacks on the reform. However, it also
seems that some policy-makers  became  concerned  with the transitional deficits caused by the loss of
revenues to the second  pillar.  Technical discussions  inside and outside the Government showed  that
the size of the transitional deficit was moderate  and that this deficit was in any case neutral from the
point of view of macroeconomic  stability (as discussed below). During the second half of 1999 the
general attitude towards the reform improved  somewhat  and the attacks subsided,  but the Government
still indicated that it would maintain  the contribution  to the second pillar at 6 percent until the end of
its tenure (mid-2002). The Government  also extended the option for workers to switch back to the
PAYG, from December  2000 to December  2002.
Actual Switching Outcomes
The Government  that passed the reform initially considered  a switching  strategy that involved
forcing all workers below the age of 40 to switch  to the new system  and all workers above that age to
stay in the reformed PAYG. However, it became increasingly  apparent  that a mandatory cut-off age
could spark constitutional battles over accrued rights and prove too costly to implement.  These
problems led the Government  to make the reform mandatory  for new entrants (after July 1998)  and
voluntary for anyone with a contribution  history in the old system. Moreover, the Government also
decided to  recognize accrued rights by  making compensatory pension payments at  the time  of
retirement, as in Argentina,  and not by recognition  bonds, as in the case of Chile, Peru, and Colombia.
The rights earned under the old scheme  are recognized  by applying  the accrual rates of the new
first pillar.  Since these accrual rates are lower than those implied by the old formula, switching
workers voluntarily forego part of their accrued rights.  The new system is still attractive to most
younger workers, because  the higher expected  returns in the second pillar result in higher pensions in
the new system under reasonable assumptions. Therefore,  the valuation of past contributions in the
context of a voluntary switch allowed the Government  a certain measure of control over the speed of
the transition and the size of early transition deficits, as well as a reduction in the implicit pension
debt.
As shown in Figure 5, if the contribution  rate to the second  pillar were set at 8 percent, as in the
original reform package, and under conservative assumptions on returns and costs (returns of 2
percent above wage growth, annuity rate equal to wage growth, and operating costs and charges
9amounting  to 15 percent of contributions),  workers below 36 years of age would tend to switch to the
new system, whereas workers above that age would find attractive to stay in the reformed PAYG.
The higher replacement ratios of younger workers are essentially due  to  the  effect of  interest
compounding over a  longer number of years.  This interest accumulation effect outweighs the
reduction in accrued rights for workers under 36 years of age, but is not sufficient  for workers above
that age.
Of course,  these are rather conservative  assumptions  about pension fund returns. As shown in
Figure 6, the rate of return-wage  growth  differential  in the 1980s and 1990s  was higher than 2 percent
in a  sample of countries with large funded systems, even  in countries that  imposed portfolio
restrictions and/or followed very conservative  portfolio  strategies, such as Denmark and Switzerland.
For the sake of illustration, assuming  returns of 3 percent above wage growth,  the equilibrium cut-off
Figure  5:  Replacem  ent  Ratios  in  the  Old  and  New  Systems  for
Each  Cohort.  Reforms  2%  above  wage  growth
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10age would increase  to 38 years of age, as shown  in Figure 7. If returns were assumed  to be as high as
those shown in Figure 6, the cut-off  age would  exceed 40 years of age.
Figure  7:  Replacement  Ratios  in  the  Old  and  New  Systems
for  Each  Cohort.  Returns  3%  above  Wage  Growth  (Gross




22  24  26  28  30  32  34  36  38  40  42  44  46  48  50  52  54  56  58  60  62
- Reformed  PAYG  -Multipillar  with  8%
|. |  _  _  _Multipillar  with  8%  in 2002  . Multipillar  with  6%
The actual switching outcome was in line with other switching experiences and largely met
initial expectations. 10 As shown in Figures 8 and 9, the number of switchers was significant in the
first few months of implementation,  kept increasing  throughout 1998  and 1999,  and accelerated  in the
last two months before the final deadline for switching  (September 1999), reaching approximately  2
million workers or nearly half of the labor force.  At that point, more than 80 percent of switchers
consisted of workers below 40 years of age, and more than 80 percent of workers in their 20s and
early 30s had switched to the new system. The increase in the number of switchers after that date
reflects primarily  the new entrants  to the labor  force, which are mostly young workers. By December
2000, roughly 90 percent of workers in their 20s and early 30s were enrolled in the new system.
There may be a number of explanations of why workers continued switching, despite the
uncertainty  caused  by the absence  of political support  to the reform  by the new Government. For one,
the possibility to switch back to the reformed PAYG by the end of 2002 may have eliminated the
perception of risk associated with early switching. Also, some workers may have speculated  that the
9 A positive difference between the return on capital and wage growth is also a condition of dynamic efficiency (see, e,g,
Barro and Sala-i-Martin).  The returns on pension fund assets shown in Figure 6 cannot be used as direct evidence of
dynamic efficiency  because they contain a risk premium on equity. However, see Feldstein (1995) for a discussion of the
dynamic efficiency condition in the presence of risk for the US case, and Kotcherlakota  (1996) for a discussion of the
equity risk premium.
10 See Disney and Whitehouse  (1992) for an analysis  of the opt-out experience  in the case of the UK, Rofman (1996) for a
description  of the Argentine  experience, and Palacios  and Whitehouse  (1999) for a comparison  of switching  outcomes in a
sample of reforming  countries.
11originally  envisaged contribution  rate of 8 percent would sooner or  later be restored.  Indeed, if the
contribution rate were  increased to 8 percent in 2003 by the same Government or a new Government
(after the  2002 elections),  the equilibrium  cut-off age would be  only slightly  reduced,  as shown  in
Figures 5 and 7.
Finally, workers switching to the new system may have probably assigned a great weight to the
political  risk  associated  with  the  PAYG  scheme.  The  perception  of  significant  political  risk
associated  with the  public PAYG  is justified,  in view  of the  manipulation  of the  parameters  of the
Hungarian PAYG benefit formula in the late 1980s and early  1990s (section 2).  The decision of the
new Government to abandon the indexation formula, negotiated and agreed for the period of transition,
and established  in the  1997 law, provides another example of how the  parameters of a public PAYG
system may be easily changed by subsequent legal amendments.
Figure  8: Number  of Switchers  to the New System
(in absolute  numbers  and in % of labor force)
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12Figure 9: Actual Switching  Outcome,  December  2000
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It is noteworthy, however, that the failure to restore the original 8 percent contribution in the
next few years could lead to a significant reduction in the equilibrium cut-off age.  As shown in
Figures 5 and 7, maintaining the contribution to the second pillar at  6 percent indefinitely would
reduce the cut-off age to around 28-33 years of age, depending on the assumption for pension fund
returns in the long-run. It is difficult to assess whether and when the contribution  rate to the second
pillar will be increased  to 8 percent. However, it is clear that there are a few cohorts that might be
better-off  switching back  to the reformed  PAYG,  if the original contribution  rate is not restored.
Simulating the PA  YG Reforms
It is useful to present the simulations  of the reform in two stages.  First, the various measures
designed  to improve  the balance  of the PAYG are examined  and contrasted  with the no reform scenario.
Second,  the direct fiscal impact  of the introduction  of the second  pillar is examined,  in combination  with
the PAYG reforms. The macroeconomic  assumptions  used are the same as those in Table 3, with the
exception  of a slightly  higher  growth rate  of the labor  force in the scenarios  which  include an increase  in
the retirement  age (which also implies slightly  higher rates of GDP growth, given the assumption  of-  a
constant  labor  share).
This section highlights  the impact of the two major  reform measures,  namely, the increase  in the
retirement age and the shift toward  mixed indexation. The changes in the benefit formula and the tax
treatment have an impact on particular  workers but little or no impact on the aggregate  balance  of the
PAYG (Palacios and Rocha (1998)).  As shown in Figure 10, the new retirement age rules reduces
significantly  the projected  deficits. This is due not only to the increase  in the statutory  normal  retirement
13age over  time, but also to the increase  in the penalties  for early retirement  and in the minimum  years of
service for early retirement. While it is difficult  to predict  retirement  behavior in the face of the new
penalties  or the average  number  of contribution  years,  reasonable  assumptions  suggest  an increase  in the
effective  retirement  age for men and women  of roughly  2 and 5 years respectively. The longer working
period raises pensions  and replacement  ratios, given the accrual  rates, but the higher pension is received
for fewer years and some individuals  continue  to contribute  to the scheme. The net effect is an average
annual reduction  in future  deficits  of about 1.5-2  percent  of GDP.
While the retirement age increase  has an important  impact, it is only when the new indexation
method  is added to the reform  package  that the PAYG  scheme  moves  into an extended  period  of surplus.
Figure 10 shows  how these surpluses  peak in 2013,  which is the year when the baby boom cohorts begin
to retire.  Later, deficits reemerge  when a second  demographic  shock hits the PAYG scheme around
Figure  10: Balances  of the Public  Pension  Scheme  After  PAYG
Reforms,  1997-2070  (in % of GDP)
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2035. With an increase  in life expectancy  of two years per decade  assumed,  the retirement  age increase
to 62 is not sufficient  to offset the demographic  developments  and to maintain a constant retirement
duration  in the long  run.
These two major parametric reforms generate an average annual improvement  in the PAYG
balance of more than 4 percent of GDP during the projection period.  The implicit pension debt,
measured according to an accrued benefit  obligation  (ABO) definition", is reduced from 309 percent
of GDP in the no reform scenario  to 241 percent of GDP with the PAYG reforms,  a reduction of more
than 20 percent.
11  The PAYG is assumed to be terminated in 1997 and the future pension obligations (accrued as of December 1997) are
discounted at the rate of wage growth.
14The PAYG reform measures  shown  in Figure 10 provide  the starting  point for the analysis of the
introduction  of the second  pillar. To this point, the package  results in a significant  improvement  in the
finances  of the PAYG  during  the next  decade,  followed  by a gradual  erosion  of the surpluses  at the end of
the following  decade. The pension  system  would  record  deficits  again  at the end of the projection  period,
and the elimination of these deficits would require further reforms to the PAYG, such as a further
increase in retirement age (say, to  65 years, as in most OECD countries) or the adoption of price
indexation. Nevertheless,  the reform  measures  achieve  a significant  reduction  in future deficits and the
implicit  pension  debt. In fact, the reforms  produce  some small  but significant  surpluses  .
Despite the presence of these surpluses,  the Government  never gave serious consideration  to a
reform package  limited to improving  the PAYG scheme,  as it saw four serious shortcomings  in such a
solution: First, the accumulation  of surpluses  in the PAYG would provide for an easy opportunity  to
reverse  the reforms  through politically-motivated  benefit  increases. Second,  it would  have created  a new
role for the public pension fund as an asset manager.  There was little reason either from historical
Hungarian or international  experience  to believe that such an arrangement would lead to  efficient
investment  allocation  or good corporate  governance. 12 Third, this solution  was unlikely  to contribute  to
the type of capital market  development  which a multipillar  package  was capable  of generating. Finally,
the promise  of higher returns in the private  scheme,  even after taking into account  higher administrative
costs, helped offset the benefit reductions in the PAYG scheme and simultaneously  diversified the
workers' risk in the long-run. This  positive  aspect  of the overall  package  was instrumental  in generating
support, especially  among younger  voters.  In view of these and other perceived advantages,  the new
system  was designed  to divert  the savings generated  by the reform  to privately-managed  pension funds
referred  to as the second  pillar.
Simulating  the Multipillar  Reform with a 6 Percent Contribution  to the Second Pillar
The simulations of the full multi-pillar package were performed assuming initially that the
number of switchers  will stay roughly the same as of September  1999,  and that the contribution  rate to
the second  pillar will be maintained at 6 percent indefinitely. Figure 11 confirms  the obvious  fact that
allowing switching workers to  divert part of their contributions to  the  second pillar causes an
immediate revenue loss to the PAYG. The revenue losses increase rapidly to around 0.8 percent of
GDP in the first 4-5 years of the reform,  and then keep increasing at a more gradual pace to reach 1.4
percent of the GDP in the third decade,  when most of the active population  will be enrolled in the new
system. The PAYG deficit would tend to increase at the same  pace, but the PAYG reforms  described
above more than offset the revenue loss, allowing a reduction in the deficit.  The system is actually
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projected  to generate small surpluses at the end of the decade, even considering the revenue losses,
but turns into deficits again in the second  decade,  with the retirement  of the baby boom generations.
The PAYG deficit peaks around 2022 but then improves, as the first significant cohorts to
receive first pillar benefits in the new system retire (i.e. those in their mid-thirties in 1998).  The
difference between the PAYG balances with and without the opt out to the second pillar increases
until about that time and narrows thereafter. By 2040 the deficit in the multi-pillar system  is actually
smaller than the PAYG deficit had the second  pillar not been introduced. These results are driven by
two factors. First, the replacement  ratio of the first pillar of the new system is about three fourths of
the replacement  ratio in the reformed PAYG. Thus, the temporary imbalances  between replacement
ratios and contributions  created by the opt out starts to taper off after the cohorts in the mixed system
begin to retire.  Second, the reform involves a reduction  of about one fourth of the accrued rights of
workers who opt for the new system. As a result,  the valuation  for the years of contribution  under the
old system  are lower than what would  have been generated  by the old benefit  formula.
To determine the first-order impact of the reform on national savings the public and private
pension savings need to be combined, as shown in Figure 12.  The PAYG balances with the second
pillar opt out are reproduced  in Figure 12, together with the net private contributions to the second
pillar (gross contributions  plus interests  minus redemptions),  and the sum of the two balances. Total
pension savings peak at around 2011, decline  thereafter,  following  the decline in the PAYG balances,
but increase again after 2020, when the first significant  numbers  of workers begin to retire in the new
system.  The contribution of the pension system to savings decline in the third decade due to
demographic aging. The private scheme starts maturing,  with increasing  redemptions  and smaller net
positive contributions,  while the public scheme  shifts into deficits. The net result is a decline in total
pension savings to around I percent of GDP.  In order to eliminate the public deficits and increase
total savings, the authorities would have to increase further the retirement age and/or shift to price
indexation.
"SFigure  12:  Public,  Private  and  Total  Pension  Balanees
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The final impact of the pension reform on national savings will depend on the reaction of
voluntary private savings to the  individual measures of the reform, and on  the reaction of the
Government to the path of the PAYG deficits and surpluses.  The reaction of voluntary private
savings to the reform is difficult to estimate numerically,  although it is possible to identify some of
the major changes that might occur. The increase  in the retirement age could induce some decline in
private savings, whereas the change in indexation would imply a decrease in expected retirement
income, inducing some increase in private savings. 13 The expectations of higher returns on the
contribution to the second pillar (relative to the PAYG) could have a positive or negative effect on
voluntary savings,  depending on the relative sizes of the income and substitution effects. Therefore,
net impact of all these factors on voluntary private savings is in principle ambiguous, and would in
any case be dampened by the existence  of liquidity constraints.
The reaction of the  Government to  the path  of future PAYG deficits will be  primarily
influenced by Hungary's objective of joining the EU by the year 2005.  Meeting  the objective of EU
membership  will require an effort to reduce  the general Government  deficit from around  4-4.5 percent
of GDP (the levels that prevailed in the late 1990s)  to levels below the Maastrich ceiling of 3 percent
of GDP. The expected  reduction  of the General  Government  deficit to levels below 3 percent of GDP
suggests that the transition will be primarily tax-financed  and that savings effects might be stronger.
However,  additional  increases in  national  savings  arising  from  offsetting reductions  in  the
Government's deficit are likely to be moderate,  as the General Government  deficit is already close to
the Maastrich ceiling, the projected PAYG deficits are moderate, and the actuarial projection even
predict a period of PAYG surpluses.
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On the whole, there is no reason to believe that the direct impact of the reform on national
savings would be substantially  stronger than indicated in Figure 12. Of course,  to the extent that the
reform has a positive impact on Hungary's growti performance, there could be additional indirect
effects on savings, resulting from endogenous  interactions between savings and growth, and these
effects are not reflected  in Figure 12.14
The perception that the Hungarian transition would be primarily "tax-financed", due to the
PAYG reforms and the overall reduction in the General Government  deficit, led many observers to
state that the reform would benefit excessively future generations, to the  detriment of  current
generations, who would be forced to "pay twice".  However, whereas it is true that the reform
package has reduced significantly  the burden on future generations,  it has not been sufficient  to fully
restore intergenerational  balance, given the severe initial  bias against these generations. Calculations
of generational  accounts for Hungary  indicate  that the pension reform has reduced the net burden on
future generations by roughly three fourths, but that future generations are expected to remain net
contributors to  the system.1 5 The reduction of the  initial intergenerational imbalance has been
achieved by increasing slightly the burden on current workers, as older workers and pensioners have
not been significantly  affected by the reform and have remained net beneficiaries  of the system. The
calculations  of generational  accounts  for Hungary  also show that current workers would have incurred
even greater losses if the second  pillar had not been introduced. What  the calculations  do not capture,
however, is the possible positive impact of the reform on Hungary's growth performance  and on the
welfare of current generations.
14 The interactions between pension reform, growth, and the welfare of different generations are examined in Kotlikoff
(1995) and Corsetti and Schmidt-Hebel  (1995). Loayaza, Schmidt-Hebel,  and Serven  (2000) provide a recent survey of the
empirical  literature on savings.
'5 Gal, Simonovits, and  Tarcali (2000).
1XSimulating the Multipillar Reform with a 8  percent Contribution  to the Second Pillar
The reluctance of the Government  to raise the contribution  rate to 8 percent, allegedly because
of the larger transitional deficit, raises the question of what would be the impact of this measure on
the balances of the system and on the economy. This analysis is summarized  in Figures 13 and 14,
where it is assumed that the contribution  to the second pillar is raised to 8 percent in 2003.  The
number of switchers  is assumed  to be the same as in Figures 11 and 12.
Figure 13 reveals the obvious  fact that the increase in the second  pillar contribution  from 6 to 8
percent would imply an additional loss of revenues to the PAYG and slightly larger PAYG deficits.
The difference  between  the two lines would be 0.3-0.4  percent of GDP in the next decades. However,
these larger deficits would be offset by larger  private surpluses,  leading essentially  to the same overall
pension balance, as shown in Figure 14 (by comparison with the overall balance in Figure 12).
Therefore, the increase in contribution rates to the second pillar would not produce any adverse
impact on key macroeconomic  variables such as inflation and the current account.
Figure  14:  Public,  Private  and  Total  Pension  Balaces  with
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The difference between the two scenarios depicted in Figures 11-14 is clearly artificial, as it
assumes  that the number of switchers  is the same. If a large number of workers switches  back to the
PAYG, the scenario with a 6 percent contribution could actually prove worse than the 8 percent
contribution scenario at the end of the projection period, as it would imply a smaller reduction of
accrued rights, a larger implicit pension debt, and possibly  larger  PAYG deficits in the long-run.
The failure to restore  the original contribution  rates could also imply some efficiency losses. A
smaller second  pillar implies a weaker link between contributions  and benefits with possible adverse
19effects in the labor market. A smaller second  pillar also implies more limited capital market effects,
due to the slower growth and smaller size of pension funds.  It is very difficult to determine the
quantitative impact of these two effects on economic  performance  in the long-run with any degree of
accuracy, but it is bound to be negative.' 6
Simulations  of Alternative (Counterfactual)  Reform Scenarios
As mentioned above, during the first stages of the reformn  the new system was criticized for
various reasons, including the generation of a transitional deficit.  Some of the critics in Hungary
claimed that a  system of notional defined contribution  (NDC) accounts would have generated the
same positive results without generating  the deficits. To examine whether this criticism is valid, this
section provides counterfactual simulations  of an NDC type of reform, and compares them with the
pure defined benefit  (DB) reform and the Multi-pillar  reformn  examined  above.
Figure 15 shows projections of the Hungarian pension system with all the major paratnetric
reforms that have effectively been adopted (e.g. retirement age increase and Swiss indexation),  and
the counterfactual  adoption  of an NDC scheme  as of January 1998. Therefore, workers retiring after
that date would receive a DB benefit  based on their accrued rights under the old DB formula, and an
NDC benefit based on their notional balances  accumulated  after that date.  Two counterfactual  NDC
schemes are simulated,  the first with a notional interest rate equal to GDP growth, and the second with
an interest equal to GDP growth plus one percent. The schemes convert their notional balances into
annuities assuming the same respective notional interest rates in the payment period.  The two lines
are compared with the pure DB reform and Multi-pillar  reform shown in Figure 11.
As shown in Figure 15, the NDC scheme paying an interest rate equal to GDP growth would
produce smaller deficits than the  Multi-pillar and the reformed DB systems at the  end  of the
projection period, while the NDC scheme paying GDP growth plus one percent ends up with larger
deficits. However, the NDC system paying just GDP growth would still fare worse than a pure DB
reform in the first 40 years. This is because the NDC scheme would "transform" the employment
growth that happens in the early and middle stages of the transition into higher pension benefits,
something that the DB scheme does not do.  In the very long-run, the NDC scheme paying GDP
growth generates  a better balance  because  it pays an interest  rate lower than wage growth  (GDP grows
at a lower rate due to decline in employment). The multi-pillar reform produce a higher deficit than
an NDC paying GDP growth, but again this is due to the partial diversion of contributions to the
16 See Levine and Zervos (1996) for an empirical analysis of capital market development and economic growth, and
Holzman (1996)  for an analysis  of this effect in the Chilean case.
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second pillar.  The overall pension balances  produced by the multi-pillar reform are better than those
produced by the NDC schemes.
The computation  of the implicit pension debt under these alternative reform scenarios  provides
another interesting tool for comparisons  across scenarios. As shown in Table 5, the implicit pension
debt (IPD) falls in all the reform scenarios, but is lowest in the multi-pillar scenario, due to the
voluntary reduction of accrued rights by switchers. The IPD of a pure DB reform is initially lower
than that generated  by an NDC paying GDP growth, because of initially lower replacement  ratios. In
the long-run,  the NDC paying a modest interest rate would produce a lower IPD, but again this is
because the replacement  ratios would drop under an NDC scheme  paying GDP growth rates. A pure
DB reform would also be capable of producing lower IPDs if accrual rates and replacement  ratios
were reduced.
Table 5: Implicit Pension  Debt under  Different  Reform Scenarios (in % of GDP)
Scenario  Base Year
1997  2010  2020  2030
No Reform  309  340  363  378
Pure DB Reform  241  226  246  254
Multi-Pillar Reform  232  208  216  214
NDC with i= gdp growth  248  233  245  232
NDC with i= gdp growth + 1%  257  255  281  288
The reforming Government  decided not to adopt a pure NDC reform for the same reasons why
it decided  not to  adopt  a  pure  DB  reform  (e.g.  excluding  a  second  pillar).  The  initial  surpluses
produced by a pure NDC reform could be depleted by politically-motivated  increases in pension
benefits, by increases in the central budget deficit, or by political interference  in the management  of
the assets leading to negative returns.  Moreover,  an NDC scheme would still be operated by the
public sector on a PAYG basis and would not have the risk-diversification  properties of a mixed
91system.  Finally, an NDC scheme would not contribute to the development of capital markets that
Hungary  and other  transitional countries  need in the current stage  of their transformation  17
4.  The Structure and Performance  of the Funded  Pillars
Evolution and Structure
Before the 1997 reform, Hungary had already a voluntary private pension scheme (the third
pillar) which started operating in 1994. The concession  of generous  tax incentives  led membership to
increase to I million affiliates by 1999,  the equivalent  of 25 percent of the labor force. The average
contribution has been about 5 percent of the average wage, and total assets reached 1.5 percent of
GDP in 1999. Affiliates in the voluntary system  tend to be middle-to-high  income workers above 35
years of age and employed in larger  enterprises. The industry  was initially very fragmented,  including
a large number of very small and poorly managed funds, but a process of mergers and liquidations
reduced  the number  of active voluntary  funds from 270 in 1994  to 160  in 1999.
The pension funds in the mandatory  (second)  pillar were constructed  as mutual associations,  as
in the third pillar.  The system started operating in January 1998 with only 38 licensed funds, as a
result of stricter  licensing criteria, and the number of funds had already fallen to 25 by end-  1999,  as a
result of mergers. Concentration  in the second  pillar is much higher than in the voluntary pillar-by
mid-1999, the five largest funds accounted for 78 percent of all members and 73 percent of total
assets, and only 8 funds had less  than 5,000 members.
Participation in  the  mandatory pillar  increased rapidly,  reaching  2  million  workers  in
September 1999, or the equivalent  of 50 percent  of the labor  force, and will continue expanding  in the
future due to new entrants in the labor force.  The total assets of second pillar institutions rose at a
rapid pace, reaching 0.9 percent of GDP in 1999,  and are expected to exceed the assets of the third
pillar in less than three years, due to the much larger membership (already twice as large as the
voluntary pillar) and the higher contribution  rate.
The  Regulatory Framework
The regulatory framework  is generally  sound and similar for both pillars, although it is stricter
for the mandatory pension funds' 8. For example, voluntary  pension funds can be established without
17 See Disney (1999) for a critical assessment  of NDC schemes. However, most of the objections to NDC schemes raised
above would not apply in the cases where the NDC scheme is smaller and just part of a broader and truly mixed pension
system, such as in the case of Latvia, Poland, and Sweden.  See, e.g., Lindeman, D., M. Rutkowsky, and 0.  Sluchinky
(2000) for an updated account of recent reforms  which include a first pillar built on NDC basis.
22any minimum capital or membership, even when they intend to offer annuities.  In the mandatory
pillar, there is a minimum size requirement  of 2,000 members  for a pension fund and 25,000 members
for those that offer annuities. In addition, annuity providing funds must create a capital reserve of
HUF 100  million.
The law stipulates that pension funds are separate legal entities and their assets must be
segregated  from those of sponsoring  employers  or other founders.  The funds are in principle governed
by their members through their boards, and the law contains detailed rules on fund governance  that
aim to preserve the independence of boards and management.  In practice, however, most fund
members do not exercise their voting rights or participate in general assemblies, making the pension
funds resemble  more mutual funds,  which are effectively  controlled  by their sponsors. The possibility
of fund members to exit poorly performing funds (switching across funds is  allowed with  few
restrictions) is expected to exert more discipline on fund managers than formal voting rights and
board rules.
Pension funds are required to employ the services of certified asset managers, accountants,
auditors, actuaries, and custodians. A minimum capital requirement on external asset managers is
imposed, amounting to HUF 100  million for small pension funds and HUF 500 million for pension
funds with over HUF 2 billion in assets. Pension  funds must use a single custodian institution,  which
is responsible for the safekeeping  of assets and for ensuring compliance  with asset allocation policies
and prescribed  investment  limits.
To ensure asset diversification  and limit the risk exposure of pension funds, investments are
subject to  quantitative limits by  asset class as well  as individual investments.  No  individual
investment may exceed 10 percent of the assets of the fund (fund limit) or 10 percent of the equity of
the issuer (issuer limit).  The ceiling on equity holdings is 30 percent of the total asset portfolio, and
the ceiling on foreign assets was initially set at zero, but is scheduled  to increase to 30 percent of the
total  portfolio by  2003.  Quantitative investment limits  on  Hungarian pension funds- appear
reasonable,  and are unlikely to be binding and to affect marginal investment  decisions,  at least in their
early years of operation. Investment  restrictions are expected to be relaxed gradually, as the capital
market develops  and the country  approaches  the date of membership  in the European Union.
Although the  regulatory framework is  generally sound, there  are  also  some  important
weaknesses in both regulation  and enforcement  that have not yet been corrected. Market valuation of
assets is required  only once a quarter, while the crediting of declared interest is effected only once a
Is Policy issues in pension fund regulation and supervision  are discussed in Davis (1995), Demarco and Rofman (1998),
23year. This allows significant room for the creation of hidden reserves  and the manipulation  of reported
investment  returns. Pension funds are required  to disclose  their terms and conditions  to new members
and to send annual statements to all their members. They must also indicate clearly their returns and
fees. However, the lack of more precise rules and guidelines  for computing and disclosing costs and
returns still creates room for different practices across funds and  problems for comparing fund
performance.
Two types of guarantees  are offered  in the second  pillar. First, the second pillar pension benefit
cannot be lower than 25 percent of the pension benefit from the first public pillar. This guarantee is
backed by a central guarantee fund to which all pension funds contribute.  Second, pension funds
must make up any shortfall in individual  returns, if investment  performance  falls below  the return of a
portfolio of long-term government  bonds by more than 15 percent. The minimum  return is backed by
a minimum  reserve equal to 0.5 percent of total member assets. Returns exceeding  40 percent of the
benchmark are placed in reserves.
These guarantees built support to  the reform but present some complications.  The first
guarantee implies a  lifetime real return guarantee of only 0 percent p.a. for young workers, but a
lifetime guarantee  of about 4 percent p.a. for workers in their 40s. The probability that this guarantee
will be called for these older workers is not negligible, especially if the contribution is kept at 6
percent indefinitely. The second guarantee  was expected  to complement  the first and improve  capital
protection, but contains some flaws in design. For one, using a bond index as a benchmark for the
second guarantee seems  to  have  distorted pension fund investments in  favor of  bonds.  More
importantly,  the excess reserves are imposed at the level of the pension fund, not the asset managei 9.
The two guarantees  together imply access to a central guarantee  fund without  putting the capital of the
asset manager  at risk first, raising the issue of moral  hazard in the behavior  of asset managers.
Performance
Unfortunately, good data on the operating fees and costs and the investment returns of the
private pension funds are not readily available.  Operating fees have absorbed between 5.5 and 7.5
percent of contributions  in voluntary funds and between  7.5 and 11 percent in mandatory funds. These
rates are lower than those reported for Latin American  pension funds, where operating  fees frequently
amounted to more than 25 percent of contributions  in the first years of operation. Three reasons may
account for this difference. First, in Hungary, there are additional  charges for asset management and
external administration, and these seem to add between 50 and 100 basis points for most funds.
Second, sponsors  of pension funds in Hungary  may have absorbed a higher proportion of operating
Queisser (1998), Rocha et al (1999) and Vittas (1997, and 1998).
24costs.  Employer-sponsored  funds, in particular,  are reported to subsidize the operations of pension
funds by providing rent-free premises and by not charging  for the time of staff who are involved in
the administration  of pension funds. Third, Hungarian  pension funds seem  to spend less on marketing
and on commissions  to selling agents  than their Latin American  counterparts.
Data on investment returns are even less satisfactory. Although most pension funds publish
some data, the numbers do not seem to include unrealized  capital gains or losses, nor accrued but not
yet received dividends and  interest. To shed some light on  the performance of pension funds,
investment returns were simulated by using average quarterly asset allocations of pension funds for
1998 and 1999, and the total market returns on bank deposits, bonds, and equities.  Assuming a
quarterly investment horizon, gross investment returns in 1998 amounted to  17 percent for the
mandatory funds and to 14 percent for the voluntary  funds against an inflation rate for the year of 14
percent. For the first three quarters of 1999,  annualized  investment  returns were respectively 13.4 and
12.8 percent for the mandatory and voluntary  funds, against an inflation rate of 10 percent. Allowing
for asset management  and custodial  fees, it is likely  that real returns on individual  accounts  have been
positive in real terms, though not much above zero.
The returns of pension funds in 1998  and 1999 were low in real terms, primarily as a result of
the financial crises of recent years, particularly  the collapse of Russian markets. These crisis led to a
sharp increase in short-term  interest rates, capital outflows, and a sharp decline in the return on equity
and bonds during 1998.  Equity prices recovered in  1999, but pension fund managers decided to
maintain  a low share of equity in their portfolios  (less than 10 percent in the case of mandatory  funds),
in view of the overall volatility in world capital markets, and did not benefit from the recovery in
equity prices.  Real returns are expected to increase  to higher levels in future years, in line with the
expected increase in the share of domestic  and foreign  equities in portfolios.
5.  Conclusions  and Possible  Lessons  to Other Countries
Hungary  has entered the fourth year of implementation  of a multi-pillar pension reform that has
proved popular among workers, despite the initial lukewarm support from the Government that
succeeded the  reforming Government, and  also despite the  poor initial performance of capital
markets, due to the Russia crisis of 1998. Approximately  half of the labor force has joined the new
system voluntarily. Most of the switchers  are workers below 40 years of age, and the young  workers
who switched account  for more than 80 percent of the labor  force in their age group.
9 Rocha et al (1999) and Vittas (1998) examine in more detail  the problems in designing  pension guarantees.
25The decision to switch was motivated by a number of factors, the most important being the
better risk diversification  properties of the new system. The credibility of the PAYG system had been
severely damaged by repeated manipulation  of its parameters and the PAYG offered clearly a low
return on contributions.  The new system is still predominantly a PAYG system, as the first pillar
accounts for more than two thirds of the total contribution,  but contains a new second pillar which
offers the prospects of higher average returns on contributions. Most workers probably understood
intuitively the risk and return characteristics  of a pure PAYG system and a mixed system, including
the capital market risk in the second  pillar and the political risk in the PAYG. The new system offers
better prospects of  long-run risk-adjusted returns for young workers, and  most young workers
effectively opted for  the  new system. However, some overselling of the new system probably
occurred as well, making older workers switch, although they would be better-off staying in the
reformed PAYG.
The Government  has decided so far not to increase  the contribution  to the second  pillar from 6
to  8 percent as originally planned, alleging that such an increase would increase the size of the
transitional deficit and possibly produce macroeconomic  imbalances.  However, the increase in the
contribution  to the second pillar would not have any adverse impact on the economy, as the increase
in the PAYG deficit would amount to only 0.3-0.4 percent of GDP, and would in any case be offset
by larger private savings.  This decision  has also violated the objectives  and the internal consistency
of the original reform package,  in which contribution  rates and accrual rates were jointly calculated so
as to produce an equilibrium cut-off age around 35-40 years of age.  Clearly, many workers have
switched counting on a higher contribution rate, and if the 8 percent original contribution is not
restored in the next few years, some of these workers will be worse-off. The failure to restore the
original contribution  rates may also produce smaller efficiency  gains in labor and capital markets than
originally  anticipated.
The PAYG is still projected to produce deficits in the long-run, despite the PAYG reforms.
Addressing these projected deficits will require further adjustments in the future, such as further
increases in the retirement age and a shift to price indexation. These future adjustments  are bound to
result  in  some reduction in  net  benefits  for  future generations.  Independent calculations of
generational accounts for  Hungary suggest a  similar outcome-the  reform package has reduced
sharply the severe initial bias against future generations,  but has not eliminated the bias entirely.
Future generations  remain net contributors  to the pension system, even after the reform.  Therefore,
the  criticism frequently voiced in  Hungary-that  the  reform  had  benefited  excessively future
generations  to the detriment  of current generations-seems unjustified.
26A more ambitious reform package would have involved larger initial surpluses (and smaller
deficits in the steady-state) and a significant reduction in the high contribution rates, with stronger
positive effects on savings and on the labor market.  However, the erosion in the tax base that
occurred in the 1990s ruled out any ambitious plan to reduce contribution  rates, and the additional
PAYG reforms that could have allowed larger initial surpluses  and/or reductions  in contribution  rates
(e.g., a direct move toward  price indexation)  were ruled out for political reasons.
Despite these shortcomings, any preliminary assessment of the Hungarian pension reform
would need to  conclude that the reform has been successful, especially considering the severe
constraints imposed by initial conditions (e.g. large fiscal deficits, high contribution rates, high tax
rates, very adverse demographic  trends). The reform has reduced significantly  the imbalances  of the
PAYG system and the  implicit pension debt, while also  introducing a  mandatory, funded, and
privately-managed  pillar that seems to be operating fairly well, despite the initial problems in the
system of payments and registration,  and some weaknesses in the regulatory framework. Moreover,
the current shortcomings  can be corrected  over the next few years, by restoring the original 8 percent
contribution  rate to the second  pillar and strengthening  the regulatory  framework.
The Hungarian  reform also suggests  that a voluntary switching  strategy  achieves essentially the
same switching outcome as a forced switch based on an arbitrary cutoff age, while avoiding legal
problems and contributing to the reduction of the implicit pension debt.  The disadvantage of this
strategy is that it leaves a few individuals worse-off  relative to their best option.  A well-designed
public information  campaign  may minimize  the occurrence  of these cases. The implementation  of the
new second pillar met initial difficulties, as the information,  registration, and payments systems had
not been yet fully developed. These initial difficulties  caused an initial discomfort  and, although  these
technical problems were eventually solved, they show that more attention to practical and technical
aspects of implementation is required from policy-makers.  Finally, the Hungarian reform would
benefit from a stronger regulatory and supervisory framework, including several aspects of asset
valuation and disclosure.  Although no major problems have been reported, and these areas of the
regulatory framework  are expected  to be improved  in the near future, a stronger  regulatory framework
could have been introduced  from the start of the program  without  major technical  difficulties.
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